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The history of Uber’s interaction with local and national governments is surveyed to provide a case study for the
wider issue of the governance of private-sector involvement, technological innovation and disruption in
the mobility sector. Uber’s tenacious and highly competitive approach to building markets is identified as
a significant challenge to authorities and the limited power they have over Uber (beyond simply refusing
access) is acknowledged. Uber’s entry into the delivery of statutory services is identified as a particularly
striking development. The case of Uber provides useful insights concerning technological innovation and
disruption, but more important is the company’s business model. The analysis enables some findings
concerning how authorities can prepare for the “next” Uber: these include working on preparedness (by
conducting futures work, for example); on standing arrangements (such as insisting on an open data model);
and on responding to the entry of a challenging provider or service, through the use of experimental
legislation.
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1 Introduction
The rich discipline of Public Policy has produced a pro-
fusion of models and theories designed to explain the
process of policy making and governance more generally
and to provide guidance to those seeking to improve on
past practice. Notable figures are Herbert Simon [48],
who introduced the concept of bounded rationality,
Lindblom [33] who spoke of “muddling through”, and
Easton [15] who attempted to apply a more formal
structure to the policy analysis process.
What would these giants make of the events of the last
six years involving the rise of Uber in the international
sphere of urban transport? Would they, as some current
commentators, be counselling more extensive regulation
to keep the organisation in check? Or might they argue
the opposite, that innovation needs to be allowed to
flourish and can only do so if unfettered? We will later
use as our reference the work of Lindblom and, in par-
ticular, his contraposition of “scientific analysis” and
incrementalism [33, 34]. He characterises the former as
the assessment of all possible options against a
comprehensive statement of objectives or values and the
latter as a more pragmatic and continual exercise of
considering typically modest adjustments to the policy
direction by asking whether they would constitute an
improvement on the status quo. One of Lindblom’s main
arguments against scientific analysis was that, with the
exception of quite narrowly defined policy questions, it
is impossible to know in advance all the impacts of a
course of action. A reason for this is of course the un-
certainty associated with the future, a subject rather less
discussed then than now, though Dror, one of Lind-
blom’s contemporaries, was arguing in the same era for
concerted futures work to feature in policy making [12].
Nor did Lindblom much address the issue of external
events affecting an authority’s capacity to respond,
though we might expect him to offer these as further
evidence in favour of incrementalism, his preferred
method of formulating policy.
Returning to Uber, what our discussion will first dem-
onstrate is that authorities have reacted in very different
ways to it. For example, at the time of writing, having
announced that it would not renew Uber’s licence to op-
erate as a private hire company, Transport for London is
now engaged in a lengthy judicial process with Uber
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over whether the latter is “fit and proper” to hold a li-
cence ([59]; [29]). Many other cities, having posed few
obstacles to Uber’s arrival, are now attempting to rein
the company in. Second, and more important for this
paper, is the challenge that Uber has posed to the
policy-making process, demonstrating its limitations
when responding to technological advance or in fact, as
we shall argue, aggressive business practices. We shall
see a familiar conflict – that between ensuring
innovation and “maximising the network benefits of op-
erating an overall transport system” ([30], p. 25). We
shall also see a tentativeness on government’s part,
reflecting a more general tendency for public policy to
lag behind changes in the operating environment.
And these developments are played out against a back-
ground of differing philosophies concerning the roles
and merits of innovation, entrepreneurship, competition
and regulation; they also prompt reflection on the po-
tential benefits of the “sharing economy” and whether, in
fact, Uber deserves to be included in it [53]. It turns out
that Uber provides a very useful case study not just for
the governance of new technology in transport, but of
the wider relationship between the public and private
sectors.
The paper begins with a survey of the relationship be-
tween Uber and local and national governments since it
entered the ride-hailing business in 2012. This is then
used as the basis for some reflections on the nature of
that relationship and the lessons it offers. The paper
ends with some specific suggestions of what authorities
could do differently in future in order to manage the
next Uber more successfully.
2 Uber and authorities – a brief history
Uber started operating in something like its current form
in 2012, having run a limousine service in San Francisco
before developing so-called “ride-hailing”1 (or “ride-shar-
ing”) now generally seen as a competitor to conventional
taxi or private hire. It was not the first to become a
ride-hailing provider, and Lyft remains a source of compe-
tition in the USA, but its current overall dominance of the
international market is not in doubt [18].
Uber arrived in an already complex and (it is argued)
dysfunctional market and elicited very different re-
sponses from policy makers. We discuss these points in
turn. And the market place within which Uber operates
has not stood still since 2012, with growth in many of its
locations in the number of limousines a noteworthy
development.
Whilst much of what is written about Uber is critical
(Morozov [36] and Harris [24] are just two examples), it
has its defenders, most notably its customers, whose
support the company has enlisted on numerous occa-
sions in order to strengthen its case to be allowed to
operate, sometimes successfully, sometimes not [43]. Ac-
cording to Posen [38], Uber gladly negotiates with city
policy makers in advance of launching, and in fact it was
officially registered with London’s transport authority –
Transport for London (TfL) – when it commenced oper-
ations there in 2012 [13]. Against this background
though, Uber is prepared to press on with launching in
the face of city resistance and is claimed to have oper-
ated in San Francisco using a loophole in taxi regula-
tions [18]. These facts, together with the extensively
reported battles over the employment status of its
drivers, have earned it a reputation for being aggressive,
or at least for finding it “easier to ask forgiveness than
permission” [60].
2.1 The taxi/private hire market before and since Uber
The growth of Uber needs to be considered in the con-
text of the markets it has entered. For example, in San
Francisco, the taxi market was notoriously poor from
the customer’s perspective [18]. Users had to wait a long
time for a cab (if they were able to book one in the first
place) and paid high fares when it arrived. In economic
terms, then, this was a natural target market for new
entrants.
Taxi services were unregulated when they first began
over a century ago; regulation was brought in to protect
road users from the safety impacts of poor driving and
the sometimes violent conduct of drivers vying for busi-
ness [38]. But the regulation, which initially took the
form of limiting the number of drivers, developed in a
variety of ways over time and location. According to
Bekken [4], writing before the advent of Uber and its ilk,
there are three categories: direct barriers to entry (prin-
cipally quantitative and qualitative regulations on the
operators); indirect barriers to entry (of which driver re-
quirements and vehicle requirements are obvious exam-
ples); and fare regulations. This is close to the four-fold
structure adopted by International Transport Forum
Corporate Partnership Board [27] in its deliberations:
public safety rules (including insurance); market entry
conditions; service requirements; and fares. In this con-
text, Darbéra [11] offers a useful clarification based on
the distinction between the French words régulation and
réglementation: regulation is the business of ensuring
that a given market “works” in some agreed sense by im-
posing a set of economic controls. Deregulation, the re-
moval of some or all of those controls, will not tend to
mean the disappearance of all rules and laws (réglemen-
tation), and will probably instead imply a range of new
ones to promote competition.
To some, regulation has lost its benign roots and
today is a mechanism for earning revenue for city gov-
ernments through the charging of supra-competitive
rates [20], or for shoring up the privileged positions of
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those who have operator licences [27]. This varied per-
ception of regulation around the world has led to
deregulation in different ways and to differing degrees.
For example, New Zealand (1989), Sweden (1990) and
the Netherlands (2000) all deregulated their taxi markets
[4, 50]. Elsewhere, it is common to see taxis (in the sense
of vehicles that can be hailed on street) treated differ-
ently from private hire vehicles (PHV) which must be
booked in advance of a journey, something which until
recently tended to happen through despatch centres.
The taxi market tends to be more tightly regulated than
the PHV market, with fare limits, maximal numbers of
vehicles/licences/drivers and a range of entry and oper-
ating requirements that both ensure quality and, indir-
ectly, control numbers. The rationale for this is that
customers have less freedom to shop around when using
a taxi that they hail on street and that they therefore
need greater protection [4]. The advent of Uber and
similar organisations have placed this approach in doubt,
with arguments emerging in favour of fare regulation in
the PHV market (which de facto includes Uber) [27].
Gabel [20] investigates the impact of Uber on the con-
ventional taxi market in various US cities, arguing that
private hire should display high elasticity because of the
lack of sunk costs on the consumer’s part and the ab-
sence of any meaningful loyalty mechanism. Put another
way, the arrival of Uber might be expected to have dealt
a massive blow to the conventional taxi. But, despite an
appreciable decrease in the price of a medallion2 in sev-
eral cities, he finds the conventional taxi to be holding
up surprisingly well in the face of this challenge. As of
2015, Yellow Cabs continued to dominate the market in
the New York City (though this may no longer be the
case), a fact attributed to the one significant advantage
they retain over Uber and its like – that it is possible to
hail a vehicle on the street. The fact that using Uber re-
quires ownership of a smart phone is a secondary
reason.
The conventional taxi communities have fought hard
in most of Uber’s locations to expel the operator or, at
least, to constrain it significantly. For example, taxi
drivers in London attempted to prove that Uber drivers
were using de facto meters. If the courts had agreed,
Uber would be considered to be operating a conven-
tional taxi service but without the necessary licences and
would therefore be required to cease trading. In this
case, the taxi lobby was unsuccessful [57].
The debate concerning Uber and the pre-existing mar-
ket (taxis and PHVs) reflects several standpoints: Uber is
variously seen as innovative and entrepreneurial [20] –
themes to which we shall return – and malign (see, for
example, [25, 45]). Some commentators (e.g. [21]) be-
lieve taxi drivers enjoy undue privilege; others (e.g. [25])
see them as a precarious sector of the workforce whose
welfare requires protection from the likes of Uber. The
balance of views differs across locations, with US writers
tending more towards an anti-regulation stance, as dem-
onstrated by Flores and Rayle, who claim that “in virtu-
ally all cities of the developed world, transportation
services are highly regulated and new entrants face in-
tense resistance” ([18], p. 3765). This range of views is
reflected in the attitudes and behaviour of policy makers,
to whom we now turn.
2.2 How regulators respond to Uber
San Francisco is a natural starting point for a survey of
regulatory responses to Uber. We have already identified
that the conventional taxi service there was considered
extremely poor and this is thought to be one factor be-
hind policy makers’ tolerance of the new entrant. But
perhaps more significant was a general enthusiasm for
innovation and “high tech”. Key city stakeholders saw
ride-hailing firms as the right kind of company to nur-
ture, first because this would provide a welcome add-
itional means of transport for the city’s residents and
employees but also because it would send a positive
message concerning San Francisco’s readiness to em-
brace novelty, a key pillar of the city’s growth plans. The
mayor and others therefore made a concerted effort to
stifle moves elsewhere in the city to contain or defeat
Uber, Lyft etc., by tolerating the use of a legal loophole
and escalating the matter to the state level, where there
were similarly sympathetic individuals who enacted
new legislation that enabled the companies’ ongoing
operation [18].
Singapore is another location which has been relatively
benign in its treatment of Uber. Tham [56], who com-
pares Singapore with Australia in terms of their respect-
ive treatment of Uber and Airbnb, concludes that
Singapore may have been the more welcoming of the
two towards Uber because of its established “high-tech”
status and smart-city aspirations. He also picks out the
weakness of the (conventional) taxi union and the state’s
political stability as factors. The second of these is plaus-
ible given that many politicians in other locations have
had to negotiate a delicate path between appearing to
undermine a well-established (and well-supported) in-
dustry and being seen to asphyxiate a highly popular ser-
vice. This is not as much an issue where re-election is a
relative formality. As part of its management of
ride-hailing firms, the Singapore government brought
them together in order to redraft relevant regulations.
As a result, ride-hailing drivers “are required to under-
take training, medical and character checks” ([56], p.
404). This collaborative approach may be unique.
In contrast with the above two examples, European
countries have tended to be somewhat less welcoming.
Dudley et al. cite “fierce battles” in France, Germany,
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Belgium and Italy ([13], p. 493), whilst Hungary’s regula-
tors expelled Uber from the country. In the UK, the pic-
ture is more mixed: Uber is now operating in all of the
UK’s principal urban areas and the UK government has
chosen not to act in response to protests by taxi drivers.
As mentioned above, Uber registered with TfL when it
commenced London operations in 2012. Whilst the city
authorities have not sought since to shut Uber down dir-
ectly, the relationship has been tempestuous, with TfL
attempting unsuccessfully to impose a five-minute wait
time before rides could commence, and subsequently
succeeding in imposing English-language and topog-
raphy tests on drivers [13]. London’s concern arises in
part from the issue of congestion: analysis of traffic data
indicates a considerable growth in the volume of “private
hire vehicles”, mirroring a large increase in the number
of licensed drivers ([58], pp. 186–188). More recently,
various members of TfL’s board have expressed signifi-
cant misgivings about the company’s conduct, threaten-
ing to seek the revocation of its licence [51]. At the
European level, cases in Spain and Belgium were re-
ferred up to the European Court of Justice, whose gen-
eral advocate concluded that Uber is a transport
company and not an information company [67], a con-
clusion which, if ratified by the Court itself, would oblige
Uber to comply with national transport legislation.
Resistance to Uber is by no means limited to Europe.
To give two examples, New York City was planning to
impose a cap on the number of drivers who could drive
for Uber put pulled back from doing this after a public
dispute with the company [17]. And Seoul in South
Korea has limited Uber to operating only its luxury lim-
ousines (i.e. not a service that would compete with con-
ventional taxis), action that was seen as controversial
given that many older and less wealthy Korean citizens
are employed at the low end of the services sector [37].
Watanabe et al. [68] distil this range of examples into a
binary model: in those locations that did not enter a
legal battle (e.g. Singapore, Saudi Arabia and Tokyo),
Uber induced a “consolidated challenge to social de-
mand” producing a “co-evolution between [the]
ride-sharing revolution and advancement of the institu-
tional systems” ([68], p. 46). Legal battles were seen in,
amongst other places, Germany, France and Italy, where
a “traditional quasi-monopolistic market protected by
non-innovative government impeded Uber’s revolution
resulting in disengagement from the institutional sys-
tems” ([68], p. 46).
The general pattern is that, if they do not ban it out-
right, authorities will struggle to control the behaviour
of Uber. This presents cities with a real dilemma: ex-
cluding Uber and its ilk may mean missing out on some
considerable transport and mobility benefits; but having
no control over it may mean negative impacts upon
existing transport systems in the short term, and more
significant problems in the longer term (discussed
below). Dudley et al. see nothing surprising in cities’
plight: they argue that regulatory systems are necessarily
reactionary but, perhaps more significant, that cities are
forced to work with “frameworks that were never de-
signed to deal with the types of technological and oper-
ational challenges presented by Uber ([61], p. 492)”.
2.3 The current situation
At the time of writing, Uber’s growth is continuing des-
pite various problems with its public relations, including
an incident that led to the resignation of its CEO, Travis
Kalanick [31]. These include accusations of blocking cer-
tain users (including regulators) [3]. Nonetheless, the
company remains popular with its users and other stake-
holders: during its recent conflict with TfL in London, it
orchestrated a petition that attracted 200,000 signatures
and included the explicit support of prominent organisa-
tions such as the Institute of Directors [13]. The impres-
sion is that those authorities that allow Uber to begin
operating are likely to see their capacity to influence it
diminish as its market share grows, given its ability to
marshal the assistance of drivers, riders and others to
lobby on its behalf. This has led commentators to specu-
late concerning how Uber might conduct itself as and
when it becomes dominant – might it employ “Ramsey
pricing” (the charging of higher rates to those whose de-
mand is inelastic, i.e. those who depend on it), for ex-
ample [20]? This appears to be consistent with the use
of so-called “surge pricing” which Uber justifies as a way
of balancing supply and demand when the latter out-
strips the former [62], but which has been widely criti-
cised as monopolistic behaviour, leading to Uber
acceding to demands to limit its multiplier in the USA
to eight [27].
The most interesting aspect of the present situation is
the blurring of boundaries between public and private
sector, with Uber becoming involved in the provision of
statutory transport in various US locations. In Florida,
for example, Uber is being paid by the city of Altamonte
Springs to reduce its fares for all citizens [63], with the
goals of increasing the accessibility of residents and
“complement transit options” [2]. The latter is promoted
by offering a slightly larger discount for Uber trips to
the local rail station. Styled as a public-private partner-
ship, this development, as with most aspects of Uber, is
attracting both praise and criticism. On the positive, the
project is argued by the city and Uber to be a highly
cost-effective way of meeting transport need (and avoid-
ing expensive infrastructure investment); an initial pilot
saw a significant increase in the volume of Uber trips
[2]. Criticisms include the risk of subsidy leakage, the
fact that Uber is unavailable to those without a smart
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phone and that the likely long-term outcome is the with-
drawal of bus services on which the “homeless and poor”
rely [35]. A particular concern – that Uber may obtain a
dominant position – is dealt with through an undertak-
ing by the city that any contract renewal would be open
to other bidders [35]. The Florida example is not unique:
in the Boston area, Uber was brought in as an alternative
to the door-to-door van service for people with disabil-
ities, despite the reservations of some users that few ve-
hicles driven for Uber can accommodate wheelchairs [1].
That the taxi/PHV sector provides a proportion of the
public sector’s transport services is nothing new – Bek-
ken [4] estimated the proportion as being above 25% in
Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, Hungary, Sweden
and Norway – but the formal inclusion of Uber in
public-sector transport services serves to legitimate the
organisation and, in so doing, to imply that the numer-
ous criticisms of its practices are either groundless or
tolerable.
3 Discussion
In some respects, Uber is just another highly successful
business enjoying exceptional growth. It is criticised for
various aspects of its conduct but is not obviously be-
having much worse than the average profit-seeking or-
ganisation. And initiatives such as its recent
announcement that it will charge users to finance the
decarbonisation of its fleet in London [61] may help to
reduce criticism. But Uber is different from many other
firms because its drivers and cars operate on the trans-
port network, which is a shared resource. Further,
whereas in the UK train operators pay to run trains on
the rail network, Uber drivers pay very little to use the
highways, a public resource managed by the state. If
transport is seen as a utility, this private-sector organisa-
tion (and others doing similar business) is profiting from
an asset that should be managed for the public good. It
is also keeping its entry and exit costs low [21] because
the infrastructure and equipment it uses are owned by
others (the state, in the case of the highway and the
driver in the case of the car). And this line of argument
is one adopted by those who would like to see Uber
much more tightly regulated.
Uber is frequently referred to as cheap, in that users
pay less in London per unit distance than for practically
any other form of private hire or taxi service. This helps
to explain the company’s extraordinary expansion. But
there is more than one aspect of cost and, as London
has detected, the substantial growth in use of Uber may
have mixed effects. Where an Uber trip is replacing a
private-car trip, the impact may be neutral or positive,
depending on a variety of factors, including the
power-trains and ages of the two vehicles in question.
Where it is replacing a trip by conventional taxi, there
may be a marginal benefit given evidence that Uber ve-
hicles are used more intensively than taxis [10]. Where
it is replacing a journey by public transport, this implies
that the network is being used slightly less efficiently in
terms of vehicle footprint and occupancy. If Uber is in-
ducing traffic growth – creating trips – the benefits of
the journeys to the individuals making them must be
seen alongside the traffic, environmental and safety im-
pacts that this new travel brings. In short, Uber’s overall
impact on the transport network and wider environment
is complex and probably negative in net terms.
What of the future? If and when Uber becomes a
monopoly in the private hire sector, will its fares remain
low? Will it allow other entrants to undercut it? Will it
become so powerful that it begins to set the transport
policy agenda: “by taking its customers and its drivers as
hostages, the monopolistic operator could even black-
mail the local governments to shelve projects that might
hurt its monopoly profits” ([11], p. 14). And, whereas in
other sectors there tends to be a single regulator at state
level (e.g. pharmaceuticals), transport is highly decentra-
lised and individual authorities are more likely to suc-
cumb to local pressure than would a national body [21].
Writers who are supportive of Uber and who tend also
to distrust structures that support established taxi ser-
vices do not accept these assertions. Whilst they may
want to see some regulation, this will tend to relate to
protecting the physical safety of road users rather than
the welfare of conventional taxi drivers or the smooth
running of the highway network. Part of the enthusiasm
for Uber lies in its rating system which is argued to pro-
vide a natural means of promoting good service as well
as rooting out poor performance. Walker Smith, for ex-
ample, sees the Uber model being replicated, with “trust”
distributed and secured “from the bottom up by com-
munity consensus” ([66], p. 389), providing further evi-
dence of the polarisation amongst commentators: those
who favour the free market applaud the “creative disrup-
tion” [46] Uber has brought and celebrate the dismay
that it has caused amongst what they see as vested inter-
ests (the established taxi market). These same writers
are not keen on regulation (except to the extent that it
protects the safety of users) and so do not express con-
cern over the way Uber is affecting the governance of
transport in cities. A perhaps more balanced view
emerged from an ITF round table on the subject which
was attended by representatives of governments and the
various elements of the taxi/PHV industry, including
Uber. Its conclusion was that equitably improving mo-
bility, safety, consumer welfare and sustainability would
“likely entail lightening entry controls for the for-hire
transport market and fares regulation for dispatched taxi
services. It will require continued oversight for services
obtained via street hail/rank, which are marked by lack
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of effective consumer choice” ([27], p. 7). The question
of whether Uber can and should be treated as if it were
a conventional PHV company continues to be debated.
For their parts, city authorities are in a very difficult
position once they have allowed Uber to start operating.
If they act to constrain it, they are pilloried for frustrat-
ing public demand; if they allow Uber free rein, equally
they are criticised for allowing an industry to suffer and
a profit-seeking organisation to indulge in unscrupulous
business practices. Does this mean that cities cannot
win? And, if this is the case where Uber is concerned,
what about the next disruption? We discuss this in the
following section.
3.1 Learning from the case of Uber
3.1.1 Themes of innovation, competition, entrepreneurialism
and regulation
The case of Uber is interesting not just because of the
facts but because of the underlying concepts and the re-
actions they evoke in policy makers and commentators.
We discuss some of these here.
We should begin with the theme of innovation as it is
central to the Uber story. In San Francisco, the perception
that Uber (and its counterparts) were innovative was cru-
cial to the decision of key stakeholders to enable its devel-
opment. Innovation is very widely seen as a good thing,
especially in the USA [38] and this is easy to understand.
How innovative Uber truly is, though, is another matter.
In fact, the significant point is that Uber was perceived to
be innovative and this was enough. If innovation is mean-
ingful, it begets change and change almost inevitably in-
volves a mixture of costs and benefits. The costs
associated with adjustment will generally be accepted if
the new status quo is considered an improvement on what
went before. Some of the discussion above shows that
commentators are divided on whether the new status quo
including Uber is better than what it has replaced. Mean-
while, the adjustment costs – at the very least a restructur-
ing of the private hire industry – are welcomed by some
who dislike what they see as its protectionist ways.
Turning to competition, Uber presents a very interest-
ing case but it is far from unique. The narrative that big
auto conspired to kill off streetcars in major American
cities is highly exaggerated but the major car firms did
seek to control public transit [49] and this serves to re-
mind us that competition is about attempting to put
one’s competitors out of business. The consumer bene-
fits from competition for as long as this does not
happen.
As with innovation, competition has its supporters
and its detractors, with the former more prominent in
the USA than in Europe. Again, it is easy to see why,
Adam Smith having made the arguments almost 250
years ago ([52] [1776]). And the polarised response to
Uber could be expected to be replicated when the next
major challenge to the transport equilibrium arrives:
those favouring competition will expect it to ensure that
the new entrant obtains a market share that reflects the
quality of their offer; those who are more nervous of the
operation of the market will worry that the new entrant
is incentivised to act in such a way as to become domin-
ant, with unfortunate consequences for many involved.
In other words, critics of Uber see it as aggressive and
unscrupulous whereas its supporters might choose
words such as entrepreneurial and creative instead.
We turn, finally, to regulation, already much discussed
in the context of Uber. For some, regulation is to be
avoided wherever possible. As Geradin puts it: “Compe-
tition authorities…have an important role to play
through competition advocacy. It is an important part of
their mission to ensure that public authorities do not
adopt or maintain regulatory frameworks that restrict
competition” ([21], p. 29). Some see regulation as a
means of ensuring fair competition and little more
whereas the more interventionist thinkers would see it
as an essential tool of governance, used to steer econ-
omy and society along a desirable path. Few, though,
would see regulation as the friend of innovation.
3.2 Uber and the sharing economy
A further lens through which the Uber story has been
told relates to the sharing economy [5, 54, 55], the com-
pany often characterised as an exemplar in the context
of a general proposition that the sharing economy is a
“good thing”. Whether Uber really is part of the sharing
economy is moot and depends in large part on the pre-
vailing definition of the term [14, 42, 45]. With the ex-
ception of UberPOOL, where strangers share a vehicle,
Uber’s services do not appear to demonstrate a greater
degree of sharing than conventional taxi/PHV, wherein a
driver “shares” the use of her/his vehicle with a paying
customer. But, as with innovation, the point is less
whether Uber really is part of the sharing economy than
that it is characterised in this way: because the sharing
economy is a “good thing”, Uber’s conduct may be
treated slightly more leniently than would be case if it
were painted simply as a “tech company”. Moreover, the
difficulties that have arisen with respect to Uber may
even be laid at the door of regulatory deficiency: Cannon
and Chung [6], for example, propose a new framework
of co-regulation precisely to counter the problems that
arise from the specificities of the technological sharing
economy.
3.3 The threat/opportunity of new technology and
disruption
This paper is predicated on an assumption that the Uber
phenomenon is a sign of things to come. New transport
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products will increasingly emanate from the private or
third sectors, offering opportunities and potential bene-
fits, but at the same time presenting authorities with less
scope for control than heretofore and thereby limiting
their capacity to manage possible threats and
disadvantages.
Disruption is naturally unsettling to all and this ex-
tends to transport policy makers, especially because
many of the decisions they take relate to infrastructure
and thus have very lengthy lifespans. In order for the
building of a railway to be a “good” decision, there must
be sufficient benefits flowing from the project to justify
the costs. But what if new forms of mobility make the
railway line redundant?
The case of Uber helps to demonstrate that new tech-
nology presents less of a challenge to authorities than
what is done with that technology. The components of
Uber’s operation – smart phones enabled for payment,
GPS, route-planning and scheduling software –
pre-existed the company’s establishment, and Uber has
not been the only firm to exploit them, with Lyft a strong
competitor in the USA [8] and Didi Chuxing dominant in
China [32]. What distinguishes Uber and its effect on
transport networks is how the company has conducted it-
self, with its aggressive (or entrepreneurial) approach to
growing its markets. But disruptors can be expected to
continue to come from outside government, and they will
vary in the extent to which their objectives align with
those of city authorities. Thus, a technological advance
may be observed but, until it is exploited, it constitutes
neither a threat nor an opportunity. On occasion, author-
ities may be able to guide its exploitation but generally
not, which means that they must wait to see who takes ad-
vantage and what the impact may be. More commonly,
the technological advance will not be observed, or its po-
tential impact will not be accurately predicted. San Fran-
cisco’s authorities perceived a threat to the conventional
taxi market from Uber, Lyft and Sidecar [18] but could
not have been expected to foresee at that time the intro-
duction of Uber into statutory transport provision. The
taxi example does, however, point to one useful finding:
industries or services that are not functioning well are nat-
ural targets for new entrants so transport authorities can
at least examine their sector to identify areas that could be
considered “at risk”.
Another aspect of the Uber phenomenon that is com-
mon to the wider evolution of mobility as a service is
the primary status of data. The transport impacts of
Uber may be felt mainly on the network but its success
as a business arises from the information it holds con-
cerning people’s travel behaviour and preferences. This
information is highly prized and could be extremely use-
ful to city authorities in planning and managing trans-
port but it is not for the most part made available,
except where such a requirement preceded Uber’s ar-
rival, as in the cases of New York City, London and the
Netherlands, where the original motivation in making
this stipulation was to enable efficient and robust moni-
toring of driver behaviour [11, 44]. It should not be
taken for granted, however, that cities will know how to
extract value from such data for the purposes of trans-
port planning. To a lesser extent, software also repre-
sents a battleground, with providers looking to agree
deals with authorities that are mutually advantageous
and critics voicing concern that this in time will make
cities hostages of the software providers [24].
3.4 What authorities can do
The examination of the case of Uber shows, amongst
other things, that developments of this kind present au-
thorities with great challenges. In this section, we discuss
the extent to which these challenges can be overcome
and which actions might achieve this.
But it is important to be as specific and realistic as
possible: calls for “bold” public policies ([28], p. 9) are
unhelpful, first because they are imprecise and, second,
because what is “bold” to one observer may be “draco-
nian” to another. Similarly, an instruction to create “an
explicit market framework for new mobility markets”
([30], p. 24) disregards the fact that it is unlikely author-
ities will know early enough what these new mobility
markets are.
So, attempting to be practical, we look at three aspects
in turn: preparedness; standing arrangements; and
response.
3.4.1 Preparedness
“You cannot predict the future but you can prepare for
it” is a phrase reproduced with sufficient frequency to
have made it a cliché. But, to the extent that it is true,
what can authorities do to prepare for the future of
mobility?
One answer is to conduct regular and methodical fu-
tures work [40, 64]. Shell famously introduced its sce-
nario planning methods in the early 1970s and was as a
result much better equipped to deal with the oil shock
of 1973 than its competitors [65].
Part of standard futures work involves study of the
past. As this survey of Uber has shown, there are lessons
from previous events that can inform future approaches
[7]. It can be helpful to range beyond the sector in ques-
tion: what, for example, can the debates concerning per-
sonal health and genetic data and insurance tell us about
the possible actions of the various parties in the mobility
sector? And, where potential threats or opportunities are
identified, authorities can usefully scope out their op-
tions in terms of response, and carry out a simple ap-
praisal of their likely costs and benefits, as argued in the
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case of governing the advent of automated vehicles [9].
This may embolden authorities to regulate in advance,
thereby achieving a degree of “anticipatory governance”
of the kind generally discussed in the context of emer-
ging technologies [23].
Less clear is whether authorities need to be reconsti-
tuted in order to meet future challenges [39]. Municipal-
ities could recruit entrepreneurs and innovators, for
example. This may better enable them to build effective
structures within which entrants from the private and
third sectors would be required to operate. (This as-
sumes that the authority will not attempt to be the ser-
vice provider itself, though this is what Seoul set out to
do when it prevented Uber from operating its UberX
service - [37].)
A final point is to repeat the observation that poorly
performing sectors are ripe for attack by new entrants.
Authorities can therefore usefully conduct an assessment
of the mobility arena to identify such natural targets and
focus their attention appropriately.
3.4.2 Standing arrangements
Can a municipality make the adoption of an open data
standard a condition of providing services within its bor-
ders? This may prove tantamount to excluding a com-
pany such as Uber but would have the advantage of
appearing a positive stance with respect to new entrants
– through sharing data, we can all expect to gain. The
requirement to share data has been managed success-
fully in certain of the locations discussed above but it
must be noted that the stipulation was already in place
before Uber began operating. A possible way of making
such requirements more palatable would to be protect
the commercial value of the data through anonymised
querying systems such as MIT’s SafeAnswers framework
[26]. Having access to detailed and accurate data from
the likes of Uber would first enable authorities to moni-
tor conduct in order to promote compliance with rele-
vant regulations and respond appropriately to
transgressions. Second, it would provide a rich source of
evidence to inform transport planning. This idea must
not be taken lightly, of course. In this era of “big data”,
authorities may struggle to find the resources to make
use of data collected by ride-hailing companies. This
issue may be resolved in part by raising revenue from
these companies; here the data could provide the mech-
anism to enable “smart charging” [22], whereby the
charge levied would vary to reflect the pressure being
imposed on the network, specific externalities, or some
other policy concerns. The case of São Paulo is discussed
in this regard below.
The example of Singapore provides another reference.
In calling together ride-hailing providers and working
collaboratively on regulations, it may have begun to
create a less adversarial operating culture [68]. The
scope of Singapore’s dealings with the ride-hailing com-
munity was limited to issues of safety but there is no
reason such a model could not be expanded in its cover-
age to include data, charging etc.
A final suggestion concerning standing arrangements is
the sharing of experiences and ideas across cities and coun-
tries, a practice that becomes more relevant as
private-sector stakeholders operate increasingly internation-
ally. This could take the form of a simple on-line discussion
forum but might lead to more formal collaborations such
as CitySDK which “aims at harmonizing application pro-
gramming interfaces (APIs) across cities” [19].
3.4.3 Response
The third category of action applies to situations in
which Uber or its equivalent has arrived and is posing
challenges from its position as an incumbent. This
returns us to the subject of regulation and its appropri-
ate application.
There is broad consensus that authorities already have
available to them the tools necessary to restore some kind
of equilibrium to the taxi/PHV market [27], though the
precise nature of the appropriate intervention continues
to be debated. It is, however, accepted that the existing set
of policy measures is blunt and that a more efficient and
targeted system of regulation could operate using, for ex-
ample, detailed data concerning vehicle movements. This
is the basis of legislation brought forward in the Brazilian
city of São Paulo which, amongst other things, uses anon-
ymised trip data as the basis for levying a charge on opera-
tors relating to distance travelled [47]. The European
Commission is pursuing a similar path with respect to
digital industries in general [16].
The more general point is that authorities should seek
the most appropriate way of pursuing their objectives,
being ready to go beyond the familiar set of policy in-
struments and perhaps using novel measures where this
is justified.
The tendency for the public sector to be somewhat
“flat-footed” in regulation has several causes but a major
factor is its tendency to be risk-averse. Because regula-
tion takes time to develop and implement, let alone re-
vise, legislators often lag behind the events they are
attempting to manage and resist pressure to “hurry legis-
lation through”. This norm is being resisted by some
who advocate sunset clauses and, more generally, “ex-
perimental legislation” [41]. In summary, there are vari-
ous ways in which law can be enacted relatively quickly
and with an in-built ability to revise or withdraw it if it
is found not to be delivering the desired outcome. In the
context of Uber-like phenomena, unforeseen external
developments may provide legislators with a justification
for making such revisions. Posen proposes the use of
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time-limited experimental regulation to support user
safety in particular: “the regulations should take on a
flexible, experimental nature until the contours of the
market are more fully developed” ([38], p. 329). The
thinking is that this approach will allow all parties to
learn what does and does not work on the way to setting
permanent regulations at a future stage. Of course, this
is easily said but may be difficult to realise. Uber, how-
ever, may have resisted somewhat less fiercely certain
measures taken against it had they been explicitly
experimental.
4 Conclusion
In concluding, we emphasise two points. First, author-
ities need to form a clear understanding of the possible
impacts of a given development, be it Uber or something
quite different, upon the communities they serve. In par-
ticular, they need to try to establish to what extent, and
in which ways, the development will support or under-
mine the pursuit of their strategic objectives. This is a
fundamental precursor to taking action.
Second, authorities need to recognise developments
for what they are and respond accordingly. Uber is de-
scribed as a technology innovator, a disruptor and a
paradigm case of the sharing economy. Whilst all these
may be true to a greater or lesser extent, what makes
Uber significant for transport authorities is that it is an
aggressive competitor which, through its backers and
business model, is able to undercut the conventional
private-hire/taxi market in numerous locations to a de-
gree that has driven extremely rapid growth. The charac-
terisation of Uber as innovator or paragon of the sharing
economy has, we have argued, allowed criticisms of its
conduct to be deflected to some degree so it is import-
ant for authorities not just to recognise the true charac-
ter of new developments but also to call it out in what
will inevitably be a very public debate. Future technology
entrants may equally be innovators and/or exponents of
the sharing economy but it will be the way in which they
conduct their business that will determine their impact
and it should therefore be this that determines the
authority’s response.
To close, let us turn back to Lindblom, whose argu-
ments for incrementalism over what he termed scientific
analysis we briefly summarised in the introduction.
Though he wrote at a time when authorities perhaps
had more confidence about their contextual environ-
ment than do their contemporaries, he nonetheless
claimed that it was foolish to attempt to imagine and
thoroughly assess all conceivable courses of action. His
argument was that it was more pragmatic and, in fact,
better in a broader sense, to judge possible courses of
action by comparing them with the status quo. It is al-
most certain that he would see phenomena such as Uber
as further evidence to support his case: the speedy emer-
gence of game-changing actors surely makes the pro-
spect of conducting scientific analysis all the more
remote. We have discussed in this paper concepts such
as innovative regulation, experimental legislation and an-
ticipatory governance, all of which may have seemed un-
familiar to Lindblom. But we sense that he would have
seen all of them as welcome aids in the business of
“muddling through” [33].
5 Endnotes
1We shall use this term in this paper for the avoidance
of confusion.
2The medallion entitles the owner to work as a taxi
driver.
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